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Abstract:  In this paper, I develop a theory of how claims about an agent’s normative 
reasons are sensitive to the epistemic circumstances of this agent, which preserves the 
plausible ideas that reasons are facts and that reasons can be discovered in deliberation and 
disclosed in advice. I argue that a plausible theory of this kind must take into account the 
difference between synchronic and diachronic reasons, i.e. reasons for acting immediately 
and reasons for acting at some later point in time. I provide a general account of the 
relation between synchronic and diachronic reasons, demonstrate its implications for the 




As limited beings, we are often ignorant or uncertain about facts that are potentially 
relevant for our decision-making. Does this circumstance affect our normative reasons for 
action? There is a live debate about whether ignorance has any bearing on what we ought 
to do and on what we are morally obliged to do. Consider the following example by Judith 
Jarvis Thomson: 
 
Day’s End: Billy always comes home at 9:00 P.M. and the first thing he does is to 
flip the switch in his hallway. He did so this evening. Billy’s flipping the switch 
caused a circuit to close. By virtue of an extraordinary series of coincidences, 
unpredictable in advance by anybody, the circuit’s closing caused a release of 
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electricity (a small lightning flash) in Alice’s house next door. Unluckily, Alice was 
in its path and was therefore badly burned.1 
 
Thomson and some other moral philosophers hold that flipping the switch was 
impermissible for Billy; that Billy ought not to have flipped the switch no matter whether 
there was a way for him to come to know the relevant facts.2 According to this view, the 
epistemic circumstances in which an agent finds herself in are entirely irrelevant for the 
question of what she ought to do. Call this view pure objectivism. According to the 
opposite view, which I will call perspectivism, the epistemic circumstances of an agent are 
relevant for what the agent ought to do. Though perspectivist accounts differ with respect 
to how exactly epistemic circumstances are relevant, they would all agree (I take it) that 
flipping the switch was permissible for Billy, given that he did not know and indeed could 
not have known that flipping the switch would cause any harm.3 
Just as we can ask the question of whether moral obligations depend on epistemic 
circumstances, we can ask the question of whether what we ought to do, in the sense of 
‘ought’ that figures in the deliberative question “What ought I to do?” and in deliberative 
conclusions of the form “I ought to φ, all things considered”, depends on epistemic 
circumstances. Indeed, given that truths about moral obligations have implications for 
deliberative conclusions about what one ought to do all things considered, as seems 
natural to assume, we can expect that the answer to the first question will pretty much 
carry over to the second question. I will not presuppose that this is so, however. My topic 
in this essay is the relevance of epistemic circumstances for the deliberative ‘ought’ rather 
than for the ‘ought’ of moral obligation. 
                                                   
1 Thomson (1990, 229). I have taken the liberty to substitute “B” with “Billy” and “A” with “Alice”. 
2 See Bykvist (2011); Graham (2010); Moore (1912, 80–82); Thomson (1990, 229–234); Wedgwood 
(2013). Of the mentioned authors, only Wedgwood explicitly endorses pure objectivism about the all-
things-considered ‘ought’ that figures in the enkratic principle and which I will call the deliberative ‘ought’. 
The other authors are primarily concerned with moral obligations. 
3 What I call “perspectivism” is often referred to as “subjectivism,” but I think it is appropriate to reserve the 
latter term for subgroup of perspectivist views (see below). Different versions of perspectivism can be found 
in Gibbons (2010); Jackson (1991); Kiesewetter (2011); Lord (2015); Prichard (1932); Ross (1939, 146–
167); Scanlon (2008, 47–52); and Zimmerman (2008). As above, some of these authors focus on moral 
obligations rather than the deliberative ‘ought’. 
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This focus has two advantages. First, it seems clear that it makes sense to ask the 
question of whether epistemic circumstances are normatively relevant in non-moral 
contexts as well as in moral contexts. For example, it makes sense to ask this question in 
prudential contexts (consider a variant of Day’s End in which Billy burns himself rather 
than his neighbour). It also makes sense to ask this question in epistemic contexts: Should 
we believe only what is true or only what the available evidence suggests (even if it’s false)? 
It’s difficult to see why we should limit our discussion to morality, and this limitation is 
avoided if we focus on the ‘ought’ of deliberation. 
The second advantage is that by understanding the debate between pure 
objectivists and perspectivists as being concerned with the deliberative ‘ought’, we avoid 
the complaint that it is a merely verbal dispute that can be dissolved by distinguishing 
different senses of ‘ought’, as is sometimes suggested.4 According to this view, there is a 
purely objective sense of ‘ought’, which warrants the verdicts of the pure objectivist, but 
there are other, belief- or evidence-relative senses of ‘ought’, which warrant the verdicts of 
the perspectivist. Yet, while distinguishing different senses of ‘ought’ may be useful and 
legitimate for various purposes, there remains an important question about which is the 
correct account of ‘ought’ in the deliberative sense of the term. The point of deliberation 
is, after all, to guide rational decision-making and belief-formation, and it can fulfil this 
function only if there is one univocal sense of ‘ought’ that figures in deliberative 
conclusions rather than a variety of potentially conflicting senses. There is thus a 
substantial question of whether the deliberative ‘ought’ is sensitive to the epistemic 
circumstances of the agent or not – a question that cannot be dissolved by distinguishing 
different senses of ‘ought’. 
As is widely acknowledged, and as I will assume throughout this essay, coming to 
a deliberative conclusion to the effect that one ought to φ amounts, roughly, to judging 
that one’s reasons, taken together, decisively count in favour of φ-ing. And so a view about 
the relevance of epistemic circumstances for the deliberative ‘ought’ has implications for 
                                                   
4 Though some of them accept the dominance of one or more of these senses, Ewing (1947, 112–144), 
Parfit (2011, 150–164) and Schroeder (2007, Ch. 1.3) all emphasize the need to distinguish different senses 
of ‘ought’ or ‘reason’. Alternatively, but in the same spirit, ought and reason statements are sometimes taken 
to be elliptical, i.e., claimed to be meaningless unless they at least implicitly refer to a particular body of 
information; see esp. Björnsson and Finlay (2010) and Henning (2014). 
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the theory of normative reasons. These implications are the main concern of this essay. 
My overall aim is to develop an account that takes reasons to be sensitive to the epistemic 
circumstances of the agent while at the same time preserving the ideas that reasons are 
facts and that reasons can be discovered in deliberation and disclosed in advice, and to 
provide an argument for it. The discussion will focus on normative reasons for action, but 
questions about the sensitivity of reasons to epistemic circumstances arise with respect to 
other reasons as well, and my account can be applied to normative reasons of all kinds. 
The essay comprises three parts. The aim of the first part is to outline a version of 
perspectivism that can accommodate the natural view that normative reasons are facts. 
The kind of perspectivism I defend holds that reasons are subject to an availability 
constraint, which can be spelled out in terms of an agent’s body of evidence. The second 
part develops this account further by drawing on the distinction between synchronic and 
diachronic reasons, i.e. reasons that call for immediate responses and reasons that call for 
responses at later times. I argue that synchronic and diachronic reasons are evidence-
sensitive in different ways and show how this fact can accommodate phenomena in the 
contexts of deliberation and advice that strongly suggest that truths about reasons need 
not be conditional on the agent’s present evidence. The third part finally presents an 
argument for my account. I argue that views denying the kind of evidence constraint I put 
forward seriously misguide agents in forcing them, on pain of irrationality, to make 
irresponsible decisions in circumstances of uncertainty.  
 
1. OBJECTIVISM AND PERSPECTIVISM ABOUT REASONS 
This essay is about normative reasons, i.e. reasons that count in favour of a response that 
an agent can give, such as an action or a belief. My reasoning is based on two basic 
assumptions about normative reasons. Both of these assumptions seem supported by 
ordinary discourse, and they are widely shared in the literature, but they cannot be 
regarded as uncontroversial. I will take them for granted in what follows. 
The first assumption was already mentioned; it concerns the connection between 
what we ought to do and what our reasons favour on balance (from now on, I always refer 
to the deliberative ‘ought’ when I use ‘ought’ without qualification). Deliberating about 
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what one ought to do is a matter of weighing reasons and so a deliberative conclusion to 
the effect that one ought to φ entails a judgment to the effect that one has decisive reason 
to φ. 
The second assumption is that normative reasons are, at least typically, facts or 
true propositions about the external world, such as the fact that you have promised to 
attend a meeting, or the fact that some treatment will provide the cure for a disease. Some 
reasons are also facts about one’s internal states (consider the fact that you have a 
headache). But they are typically not mental states themselves, and they are never false 
propositions. I say that they are “typically” not mental states, because I do not want to 
deny that mental states can, in particular cases, qualify as reasons. For example, I do not 
want to deny that perceptual seemings can qualify as reasons for belief. Typically, 
however, normative reasons (for both action and belief) are ordinary facts about the 
external world. This is at least what we seem to presuppose in ordinary discourse. Firstly, 
we typically refer to reasons by citing ‘that’-clauses; we may say, for example: “that you 
have promised to attend the meeting is a reason to leave now”.5 Secondly, once a 
proposition p is accepted as false, a statement to the effect that p is a reason to φ is usually 
retracted or regarded as falsified as well. If you haven’t promised to attend, then that you 
have promised to attend cannot be a reason for anything. 
In the light of these natural assumptions, it pays to distinguish two quite different 
ways to spell out the idea that what we ought to do may depend on our epistemic 
circumstances: 
 
Subjective perspectivism: What A ought to do depends primarily on the (possibly false) 
contents of A’s actual or counterfactual beliefs. 
                                                   
5 This is not to deny that we sometimes express reason statements without citing ‘that’-clauses. However, as 
Schroeder (2007, 20–21) has convincingly argued, whenever something other than a proposition is cited as 
a reason, a proposition can equally well be cited to make the same point, while the converse is not true. 
Therefore, only views that take reasons to be propositionally structured can give a unified account of what 
reasons are. 
 6 
Objective perspectivism: What A ought to do depends primarily on the facts that are 
epistemically available to A.6 
 
This distinction is often overlooked in the debate, if, as is common, authors label the 
denial of pure objectivism as “subjectivism”, or assume that pure objectivism is supported 
by the idea that what we ought to do must depend on the facts.7 Note that only objective 
versions of perspectivism seem compatible with my basic assumptions that ‘ought’ is a 
function of reasons, and reasons are facts. I will therefore disregard subjective 
perspectivism in what follows.8 
According to a widespread assumption in the literature, pure objectivism and 
perspectivism can be defined as variants of the teleological thesis that what we ought to do 
is a function of value – objective value, in the case of pure objectivism; believed, expected 
or prospective value in the case of perspectivism.9 I believe that this is a mistake. One 
problem is that the question of the relevance of epistemic circumstances applies not only 
to normative judgments about actions, but also to normative judgments about beliefs and 
other attitudes, and the teleological setup cannot plausibly be applied to such 
judgments.10 A further problem is that the teleological account presupposes the substantial 
thesis that what we ought to do is always a function of the value of our actions. This is 
                                                   
6 Note that both of these claims are compatible with the assumption that there are enabling conditions for 
ought-claims that need neither be believed nor epistemically available, such as the condition entailed by the 
principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. 
7 Compare Thomson (1983, 178–179): “Surely what a person ought or ought not to do […] does not turn 
on what he thinks is or will be the case, or even on what he with the best will in the world thinks is or will 
be the case, but instead on what is the case.” 
8 Some versions of subjective perspectivism (namely those according to which what we ought to do depends 
primarily on what we would believe if we believed in accordance with our evidence) may converge in their 
normative verdicts with some versions of objective perspectivism (namely those according to which what we 
ought to do depends primarily on those facts that are part of our evidence), though this is not a trivial 
assumption. Even if these views converge in their verdicts, however, they still disagree about the explanation 
of why these verdicts are correct. 
9 Examples include Jackson (1991) and Moore (1912, 80–82), who discuss the question right from the start 
within a consequentialist framework, but also Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) and Zimmerman (2008), 
who purport to give an account that is independent of consequentialism. Zimmerman (2008, 2–5) gives at 
least a rudimentary illustration of his opinion that his approach is compatible with different sorts of 
substantive moral theories, but it clearly involves controversial assumptions about the possibility of 
“consequentialising” deontological views.  
10 Here I agree with Raz (2011, 41–45) that epistemic reasons are not to be explained in terms of value, 
such as a putative value of having true beliefs. 
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controversial: many philosophers hold that the right is not in this way determined by the 
good. Whatever account is correct here, it should be clear that the question of how what 
we ought to do relates to epistemic circumstances is a different one and should not be 
conflated with the first by defining positions on the normative relevance of epistemic 
circumstances in terms of value-determination. 
An alternative route is suggested by the assumption that the deliberative ‘ought’ is 
a function of a person’s reasons. Given that an agent ought to φ if and only if she has 
decisive reason to φ, the following strikes me as a very natural way of spelling out 
objective perspectivism: 
 
The evidence-relative view: A has decisive reason to φ iff A’s available reasons count 
decisively in favour of φ-ing.11 
 
What does it mean to say that a reason is available? I shall take for granted the idea, 
common in philosophical debates about theoretical rationality, that agents have at their 
disposal a body of evidence that provides reasons for beliefs.12 Further, I shall assume that 
for something to be part of an agent’s evidence, it is a sufficient condition that the agent 
knows it. If you know that it is raining, then the fact that it is raining is part of your 
evidence; it might be your evidence for believing that the streets are slippery, for example. 
It follows that facts or true propositions about the external world can be evidence. As 
propositions or facts that are part of an agent’s body of evidence can figure as reasons for 
belief that are available in the relevant sense, the very same propositions or facts can also 
figure as practical reasons that are available in the relevant sense. If the fact that it is 
raining is among your evidence, it might provide you with an available reason to believe 
                                                   
11 By contrast, subjective versions of perspectivism may be defined in terms of apparent reasons, i.e. reasons 
we would have if our actual or counterfactual beliefs were true. This is, in effect, Parfit’s view (2011, 150–
164). According to Parfit, the sense of ‘ought’ that is “most important […] when we are trying to decide 
what to do” (2011, 158) does not correspond to actual reasons, but to apparent reasons; Parfit is thus a 
subjective perspectivist about the deliberative ‘ought’. Subjective perspectivists either have to give up the 
assumption that reasons are facts or the assumption that what we ought to do, in the sense relevant in 
deliberation, is a matter of reasons. Parfit gives up the latter assumption. See Kiesewetter (2012) for a 
discussion and critique of his view on these matters.  
12 See e.g. Kelly (2006, §1), Williamson (2000, 186–190). 
 8 
that the streets are slippery, but it might just as well provide you with an available reason 
to take an umbrella with you. 
Is being known not only a sufficient but also a necessary condition for something 
to be part of an agent’s body of evidence, as Timothy Williamson claims?13 Everything I 
go on to argue is, I think, compatible with this view, but it is also compatible with more 
liberal accounts of evidence, which allow that evidence might also consist in, for example, 
phenomenal experiences that are not propositionally structured, internal facts about 
which the agent has not formed a belief, or truths that the agent justifiably believes but 
does not know. There is no need to decide these questions here. What I will assume, 
however, is that evidence is in an important sense factive and that evidence is mentally 
accessible. More precisely, I will assume that for E to be part of an agent’s body of 
evidence, E either needs to be the case (if E is propositionally structured) or occur, and E 
either needs to be believed or be some internal fact or experience. Williamson’s 
conception of evidence satisfies these criteria, but it is not necessary at this point to 
exclude other possible views that satisfy them. 
The evidence-relative view claims that what an agent ought, or has overall decisive 
reason, to do is determined only by her available reasons. It is natural to ask what must be 
true on the level of pro tanto reasons in order for this view to be true. According to one 
interpretation of the evidence-relative view, all facts can be pro tanto reasons, but only 
available reasons count when it comes to determining what we ought or have overall 
decisive reason to do.14 According to another interpretation, only facts that are part of an 
agent’s evidence can be reasons to begin with. Facts that are not part of an agent’s 
evidence, but would be available reasons if they were, are merely potential reasons.15 
Nothing essential seems to hang on the question which of these two 
interpretations of the evidence-relative view we adopt. And yet there are some 
considerations that arguably favour the latter view over the former. The first is that the 
former view allows for the existence of reasons that do not contribute to the truth of 
                                                   
13 Williamson (2000, Ch. 9).  
14 Lord (2015, 28–29) adopts the view that all facts can be reasons that there are for us, but only the reasons 
that we possess contribute to the truth of deliberative conclusions about what we ought to do. 
15 Compare Gibbard (1990, 162). 
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deliberative conclusions at all, and it seems doubtful how something that has no relevance 
for deliberation could still be a reason.16 The second is that a view that allows for 
unavailable, non-contributing pro tanto reasons is committed to the possibility that an 
agent ought to φ even though there are in fact stronger reasons for this agent not to φ. It 
seems to me preferable to avoid this commitment. The third and perhaps most important 
consideration has to do with the fact that admitting unavailable reasons creates problems 
if one accepts certain kinds of available reasons that a proponent of the evidence-relative 
view should be willing to accept. These are reasons that are constituted by evidential 
probabilities. For example, if there is a high chance (conditional on your evidence) that 
box 1 contains the main prize, then the proponent of the evidence-relative view should be 
willing to say that this is a reason for you to choose box 1. But if box 1 does not in fact 
contain the prize, and unavailable facts can provide reasons, then this fact is a reason for 
you not to choose box 1. The interpretation of the evidence-relative view that allows for 
unavailable reasons is now committed to the following description of your reasons: that 
there is a high chance that box 1 contains the prize is a reason to choose box 1, but that 
box 1 does not contain the prize is a reason not to choose box 1. This description does 
not seem to be sensible. The mentioned facts could not both be reasons in the same 
situation; they could not be weighed against each other. This is not because weighing 
them is practically impossible from your point of view, but because there is no single point 
of view from which these two facts can sensibly be weighed against each other. It is better, 
then, to regard the fact that box 1 does not contain the prize as a potential reason against 
choosing box 1, i.e. as a fact that would be a reason if it were available. 
The evidence-relative view, thus understood, holds that something can be a reason 
for an agent only if it is part of this agent’s evidence. Given my assumption that evidence 
must be mentally accessible, this seems to entail that an external fact can be a reason only 
if it is believed. This, in turn, conflicts rather obviously with the natural assumption that 
reasons can be discovered, that we can learn that we had a reason that we ignored before. 
In order to avoid this implication, we might feel the inclination to adopt a broader 
                                                   
16 See also Henning (2014, 608–612). 
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conception of availability, which includes not only everything we know, but also 
everything that we are in a position to know.17 
This view poses a number of problems, however. First, an agent might be in a 
position to know p, but end up being still ignorant of p if she conforms to all of her 
decisive reasons. In such a case, it is difficult to see why, from the standpoint of 
perspectivism, what this agent ought to do should be taken to depend on whether p is the 
case. Second, we are psychologically incapable of believing everything we are in a position 
to know, and it is difficult to see why, from the standpoint of perspectivism, what we 
ought to do should be taken to depend on the truth of a set of propositions that we 
cannot believe together. Third, and most importantly, a view that adopts this broad 
notion of availability faces a serious problem when we focus on reasons to act 
immediately. The problem is that coming to believe what one is in a position to know 
takes time – time that we sometimes cannot spend on coming to believe what we are in a 
position to know without thereby acting irresponsibly. Reasons to act immediately should 
be immediately accessible; their mediate accessibility is beside the point. I will be in a 
better position to substantiate this objection below, but I hope it is at least clear why one 
might think that it makes sense to insist on a stricter notion of availability, at least for 
reasons to act immediately.  
 
2. EVIDENCE CONSTRAINTS ON SYNCHRONIC AND DIACHRONIC REASONS 
My own account deals with this problem by drawing on the distinction between 
synchronic and diachronic reason statements – statements to the effect that at some time t, 
A has reason to φ at that time t; and statements to the effect that at some time t, A has 
reason to φ at some time later than t. To get a grip on this distinction, consider a case in 
which on Monday, Anna promises Bob to help him move on Friday. Given this setup, we 
can distinguish the following two reason statements: 
 
(S) Synchronic: On Friday, Anna has reason to help Bob move on Friday. 
(D) Diachronic: On Monday, Anna has reason to help Bob move on Friday. 
                                                   
17 Gibbons (2013, 176–177) and Lord (2015, 29, n. 5) both seem to adopt this view.  
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Before discussing this distinction in a bit more detail, I would like to make two 
clarificatory remarks. First, I will sometimes, for convenience, speak of synchronic and 
diachronic reasons, even though strictly speaking, the distinction I want to draw applies to 
statements about reasons, not to reasons themselves. It is not that (S) and (D) mention two 
different reasons, one of which is synchronic while the other is diachronic. Rather, one 
and the same reason (the fact that Anna has promised her help), figures in synchronic or 
diachronic reason statements. Second, the following discussion is based on the simplifying 
assumption that reasons relate to points in time, even though strictly speaking, the relevant 
units of time must be temporally extended, at least to a degree that allows one to respond 
to the relevant reason with appropriate promptness. This follows already from the fact 
that the responses favoured by reasons are themselves temporally extended. But even apart 
from this fact, it seems clear that many reasons allow for considerable latitude with respect 
to the time of their satisfaction and must therefore be seen as relating to periods rather 
than points of time. To handle the discussion and keep focused on the main question of 
this paper, I shall ignore this complication, however. I hope to come back to it on another 
occasion. 
It may be asked why we should accept truths of the form (D) over and above 
truths of the form (S). In terms of our example, the answer is that (S) alone cannot 
account for the fact that once Anna gives the promise on Monday, this changes the 
normative situation. For example, on Tuesday Anna has a derivative reason against going 
on a one-week road trip because doing so is incompatible with her helping Bob on Friday. 
Plausibly, this reason derives from a reason to help Bob on Friday. But since it cannot 
derive from a future (synchronic) reason that Anna will have on Friday, it must derive 
from a present (diachronic) reason to help Bob on Friday. For one, if we assume that the 
future synchronic reason provides a derivative reason against leaving for the trip on 
Tuesday, then we should likewise accept that it provides such a reason on Sunday. 
Plausibly, however, on Sunday, before she gave the promise, Anna did not have a 
derivative reason against going on the trip. Call this the argument from overgeneration. 
For another, Anna might have the derivative reason even if (S) is false and she will not in 
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fact have a reason to help Bob moving. To see this, suppose that despite having promised 
to help, Anna leaves for the trip and thereby makes it the case that on Friday, she is no 
longer able to help Bob moving. If, as seems plausible, ‘having a reason’ implies that one 
can do the thing in question, this falsifies (S).18 But we should not conclude from this that 
Anna did not have a reason against leaving for the trip. This reason thus cannot derive 
from a future reason to keep her promise; it must derive from a present reason to do so. 
And so we need to accept truths of the form (D) over and above truths of the form (S). 
Call this the argument from undergeneration.19 
Neither of these arguments turns on particular assumptions about the reason-
giving force of promises. The argument from undergeneration works for any reason to φ 
that you might have in the future and which, intuitively, provides present derivative 
reasons not to incapacitate yourself from φ-ing in the future. These might be reasons to go 
to the doctor, reasons to help others in need, or whatever other reasons you accept. The 
argument from overgeneration works for any reason to φ that you might have in the 
future and which, intuitively, provides derivative reasons against incapacitation that you 
have at some, but not all, earlier times. These might be reasons that you have because you 
gave a promise, but also reasons to apologise because you wronged someone, or reasons to 
care for a child because you adopted it and thus undertook the responsibility to foster it. 
The basic idea of the evidence-relative account I am proposing is that the 
constraint that a reason must be part of an agent’s body of evidence applies only to 
synchronic reasons: 
 
Synchronic evidence constraint: At t, R is a reason for A to φ at t, only if at t, A’s evidence 
includes R. 
 
                                                   
18 As this argument is presented here, it presupposes that pro tanto reasons imply ‘can’, which is more 
controversial than the claim that ‘decisive reason’ or ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. This is not essential, however, 
since the same argument can be restated in terms of decisive reasons. For a forceful defence of the claim that 
not only ‘ought’ but also ‘reason’ implies ‘can’, see Streumer (2007). 
19 Similar considerations have led other authors to distinguish between synchronic and diachronic reasons 
or obligations (though not necessarily by using my terminology); compare, for example, Goldman (1976, 
449–450), Streumer (2007, 368; 2010, 80–82), and Vranas (2007, 175–178). 
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On the notion of evidence sketched above, this constraint guarantees that synchronic 
reasons are immediately accessible to an agent. But it also allows that reasons can consist 
in facts that are yet to be discovered by the agent, provided that these are reasons to do 
something at a later time. As a matter of course, this raises the questions of what the 
evidence-relative view has to say about diachronic reasons, how what it has to say relates 
to the synchronic evidence constraint, and what justifies the assumption that different 
constraints apply to synchronic and diachronic reasons. I shall answer these questions in 
turn. 
My main thesis is that all reasons are subject to the following general constraint: 
 
General evidence constraint: At t1, R is a reason for A to φ at t2, only if A’s evidence at t2 
would include R if A conformed to her decisive reasons at every t from t1 to t2.20 
 
On this view, the relevant evidence that constrains diachronic reason claims is not the 
actual present evidence, but the evidence that the agent would have at the time at which 
she is supposed to give the relevant response, if up until that time she followed a course of 
responses that we might call “normatively optimal”, i.e. a course that is such that 
following it involves no violation of a (synchronic) decisive reason claim. 
The constraint is general because it provides the correct conditions not only for 
diachronic but also for synchronic reasons. If we assume that t1 and t2 are identical, then 
the condition that A conforms to all her decisive reasons between t1 and t2 is trivially 
satisfied, and the evidence that A would have if she satisfied that condition just is the 
evidence that she actually has. The general evidence constraint thus entails the synchronic 
evidence constraint. And so it is not really true to say that on this account, different 
constraints apply to synchronic and diachronic reason statements; rather, there is one 
constraint that applies to all of them, and there are others that can be derived from it. 
                                                   
20 Though still in the same spirit, this claim involves some revisions of the account I proposed in 
Kiesewetter (2011, 16). One difference is that the view suggested here takes as relevant the possible worlds 
in which one conforms to all one’s decisive reasons, and not only to one’s decisive reasons for seeking 
evidence. This step is suggested by the general account of synchronic and diachronic reasons below. 
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Still, the question is why we should not think that both synchronic and diachronic 
reason claims are subject to the simpler constraint that requires all present reasons to be 
part of the present evidence. This view is implicit (and in some cases explicit) in almost all 
(if not all) perspectivist treatments – implicit in those that do not distinguish between 
synchronic and diachronic reason statements; and explicit in those that particularly claim 
that diachronic reasons depend on present epistemic circumstances.21 
The first point against this standard way of understanding perspectivism is that 
the arguments that favour epistemic constraints in general, at least the arguments I am 
aware of, simply do not support the claim that diachronic reasons depend on present 
evidence, and that in the absence of such an argument, we should not accept such a 
restrictive constraint on diachronic reasons. The second point is that my alternative 
proposal allows us to accommodate a number of phenomena in which the use of ‘ought’ 
and ‘reason’ is geared to evidence that is better than the agent’s present evidence and 
thereby solves the most pressing problems that perspectivism faces. For example, it allows 
for making sense of the fact that agents, when deliberating about what they should do, 
often seek new evidence in order to find out the correct answer to their deliberative 
question. While standard forms of perspectivism can account for the fact that agents 
sometimes ought to seek new evidence (namely if their present evidence favours doing so), 
they cannot explain why agents in doing so usually understand themselves as finding out 
what they ought to do rather than changing the truth about what they ought to do. My 
account makes sense of this, because when agents are trying to find out what they ought 
to do, they are concerned with future actions, and reasons for future actions do not 
depend on the present evidence, but on the evidence one would have in the future if one 
followed a normatively optimal course. 
Similar considerations apply to the much-discussed problem that standard forms 
of perspectivism have with accommodating advice. As Thomson and many others have 
pointed out, it is clear that a better-informed adviser will base his advice on what the 
agent ought to do not on the present evidence of the agent, but on his own better 
                                                   
21 See Zimmerman (2008, 135) for a perspectivist view that distinguishes synchronic and diachronic reason 
statements (in Zimmerman’s terms “immediate” and “remote” obligations, cf. p. 128) and directly entails 
that diachronic reasons depend on present information. 
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evidence. Standard forms of perspectivism may be able to explain why advisers ought to 
do this (their own evidence favours doing it), but they have a hard time making sense of 
our strong intuition that such statements of advice could be correct, rather than 
constituting justified lies.22 My account, in contrast, is perfectly compatible with the truth 
of such statements of advice. Since advising people is pointless unless we assume that there 
is still time for the agent to take new information into account before acting, advice must 
be concerned with diachronic rather than synchronic reasons, and such reasons depend, 
according to my account, not on the present evidence, but on the evidence that the agent 
will have at the time of acting if she follows a normatively optimal course. Apart from far-
fetched cases, this course will include taking account of the information of the adviser, 
and so advisers can correctly base their advice on this information.23  
So there is much to gain for perspectivists by accepting the general evidence 
constraint rather than a simple constraint according to which both synchronic and 
diachronic reason claims depend on present evidence. In addition to these considerations, 
I shall now present an entirely independent argument that purports to show that if one 
accepts the synchronic evidence constraint, then one should also accept the general 
evidence constraint. The argument is based on the following claim: 
 
Compatibility constraint: At t1, A has decisive reason to φ at t2, only if A’s φ-ing at t2 is 
compatible with A’s following a normatively optimal maximal course of responses 
available at t1. 
 
Let me explain. At some time t1, there are various courses of responses available to an 
agent. An available course is maximal just when no other available course includes it. 
                                                   
22 Compare Graham’s (2010, 92) complaint against Zimmerman’s (2008, 32–33) treatment of advice. In a 
more recent discussion, Zimmerman (2014, 82–87) aims to vindicate the intuition that advisers can 
truthfully base their advice on better information. But since he continues to hold that diachronic ‘oughts’ 
depend on present evidence, he can accommodate this idea only by positing a particular interpretation of 
what requests for advice ask for, which strikes me not only as ad hoc but also as independently unattractive, 
because it sacrifices the natural idea that agents seek advice because they seek an answer to their deliberative 
question “What ought I to do?”.  
23 The case of advice from better-informed sources raises further questions that I cannot satisfactorily discuss 
here. I have tried to do this elsewhere; see Kiesewetter (2011) for an extensive discussion. 
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Among the available maximal courses, only some will be normatively optimal, i.e. only 
some will be such that if A followed that course, then at every t from t1 forward, A would 
conform to her decisive reasons at t. The compatibility constraint says that satisfying a 
present decisive reason claim must be compatible with following a normatively optimal 
maximal course.  
We can see how plausible this claim is by looking at what it means to deny it. Let 
us suppose that A has decisive reason to φ at t2, even though φ-ing at t2 would not be 
compatible with following a normatively optimal maximal course. Then, either there is no 
normatively optimal maximal course, or there is one, but following it is incompatible with 
φ-ing at t2. In either case, the only way for A to conform to her present decisive reason 
would be to violate another present or future decisive reason. Hence, denying the 
compatibility constraint commits one to accepting the possibility of some kind of tragic 
dilemma between decisive reason claims – a case in which whatever you do, you will do 
something wrong. Some embrace this possibility in the case of moral obligations, but even 
those who do are quick to point out that such dilemmas cannot occur at the level of the 
all-thing-considered ‘ought’ of deliberation.24 Certainly, we should expect there to be a 
way of conforming to a decisive reason that does not necessitate the violation of another 
(present or future) decisive reason. At every t, there must be a course of responses available 
to an agent that is normatively optimal, and conformity with present decisive reasons 
must be compatible with following such a course. 
In order for the compatibility constraint to be true, there must be some kind of 
systematic connection between synchronic and diachronic reason claims. What is this 
connection? The constraint itself suggests an account along the following lines: 
 
                                                   
24 See Williams (1965, 123–124). I argue in more detail against the possibility of conflicting deliberative 
ought claims in Kiesewetter (2015, 930–934).  
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General account: At t1, R is a reason for A to φ at t2 iff (i) at t1, R is the case (as are 
background conditions Ci, …, and Cn), and (ii) if A conformed to her decisive reasons at 
every t from t1 to t2, then at t2, R would be a reason for A to φ at t2 (partly because of Ci, 
…, and Cn). 
 
A detailed discussion of the relation between synchronic and diachronic reasons is a topic 
for a separate paper. What is important in our context is that the compatibility constraint 
strongly supports the idea that diachronic reasons correlate with the synchronic reasons of 
a normatively optimal course, which is at the core of the general account. As far as I can 
see, any systematic account of the relation between synchronic and diachronic reasons 
must correlate diachronic reasons with the synchronic reasons of some course of responses 
or a set of such courses. Suppose that we correlate diachronic reasons with the synchronic 
reasons of a suboptimal course. At some point during that course, your synchronic reasons 
might very well require an action that you can only perform because you deviated from 
the optimal course. It would follow that your diachronic reasons require an action that 
you can only perform if you deviate from the normatively optimal course, and this 
violates the compatibility constraint. It is thus difficult to see how an account that does 
not correlate diachronic reason claims with synchronic reason claims of a normatively 
optimal course could accommodate the compatibility constraint.  
The general account states that our diachronic reasons correlate with the 
synchronic reasons of a normatively optimal course. According to the synchronic evidence 
constraint, synchronic reasons must be part of the synchronic evidence. It follows from 
these two assumptions that facts provide diachronic reasons only if they would be part of 
one’s evidence if one followed a normatively optimal course. That is, the general evidence 
constraint follows from the synchronic evidence constraint and the general account, 
which in turn seems part of the best explanation of the compatibility constraint. All that is 




3. IN DEFENCE OF THE SYNCHRONIC EVIDENCE CONSTRAINT 
In my view, perspectivism is best understood along the lines of a constraint which entails 
that a fact can be a synchronic reason for an agent only if it is part of that agent’s 
evidence. Pure objectivism can be understood as the view that there is no such evidence 
constraint, neither on the existence of pro tanto reasons, nor on which pro tanto reasons 
bear on the truth of deliberative conclusions about what an agent ought or has decisive 
reason to do. Intermediate views are possible, of course. Such views deny the synchronic 
evidence constraint but accept some weaker constraint on reasons (or contributing 
reasons), such as the condition that R must in principle be knowable by a human being, 
or by the agent herself.25 Even though the argument that I will present in this section is, 
strictly speaking, concerned only with pure objectivism, it eventually affects such 
intermediate views as well, and so it is really an argument against all views that deny the 
synchronic evidence constraint. 
As is well-known, pure objectivism faces a lot of pressure from what I will call 
“known ignorance cases”, such as the following famous example by Frank Jackson: 
 
Jill is a physician who has to decide on the correct treatment for her patient, John, 
who has a minor but not trivial skin complaint. She has three drugs to choose 
from: drug A, drug B, and drug C. Careful consideration of the literature has led 
her to the following opinions. Drug A is very likely to relieve the condition but 
will not completely cure it. One of drugs B and C will completely cure the skin 
condition; the other though will kill the patient, and there is no way that she can 
tell which of the two is the perfect cure and which is the killer drug.26 
 
As Jackson points out, the intuitively correct verdict in this case is that Jill ought to 
prescribe drug A. This is also what the evidence-relative view entails (if we combine it 
                                                   
25 For the former view, see Thomson who now (whilst slightly modifying her former view) accepts the 
constraint that “we ought to do a thing only if a human being can know that we ought to” (Thomson 2008, 
198). For the latter view, see Raz (2011, 110): “if some people cannot know of a fact it does not constitute a 
reason for them, even though other people can know about it”. 
26 Jackson (1991, 462–463). Regan (1980, 265) and Parfit (2011, 159) present structurally equivalent cases. 
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with any plausible first-order normative theory). The relevant available reasons are the 
following facts: drug A is very likely to relieve the condition; there is a 50 per cent chance 
that drug B will completely cure the condition and a 50 per cent risk that drug B will kill 
the patient; and there is a 50 per cent chance that drug C will completely cure the 
condition and a 50 per cent risk that drug C will kill the patient. According to any 
plausible normative theory, the balance of these reasons clearly weighs in favour of giving 
A and against giving B or giving C. So what Jill ought, intuitively, to do is provided by 
the balance of her available reasons.27 
Pure objectivism, in contrast, seems incapable of giving the intuitively correct 
verdict in this case, for there is a fact of the matter which of the drugs provides the 
complete cure. Let us say that this is drug C (“C” as in “cure”). Since the pure objectivist 
denies the existence of an evidence constraint, he cannot exclude this fact from Jill’s 
reasons; he is committed to the claim that the fact that C provides the cure is a reason to 
give drug C.28 Once we accept this, it is difficult to see how this reason could be 
outweighed by any other consideration that is relevant in this case. What better reason 
could there be? Surely the fact that C provides a complete cure is not outweighed by the 
fact that A relieves the patient’s condition. Could it be outweighed by the fact that there is 
a 50 per cent risk that drug C will kill the patient? That does not make any sense. The 
risk in question is epistemic, it is relative to a set of information that does not include the 
fact that drug C will cure the patient. Once we accept that the fact that C is the cure as a 
reason to give C, we cannot at the same time take the fact that there is a risk that C is not 
the cure as a reason not to give C. There is no coherent standpoint from which both of 
                                                   
27 I am here assuming that moral considerations provide reasons; reasons that in turn contribute to 
deliberative conclusions about what one has overall decisive reason, or ought, to do. If you believe that 
moral considerations provide such reasons only for agents with particular moral desires, you are free to 
assume that Jill has such desires. If you believe that only self-interested considerations provide reasons, you 
are free to assume that John is identical to Jill. Nothing in the arguments to come hinges on the assumption 
that moral considerations provide reasons for every person no matter her desires or interests. 
28 As Stefan Brandt pointed out to me, one can avoid this implication by denying that giving C is an option 
for Jill and insisting that Jill’s “real” options are giving A, on the one hand, and choosing randomly between 
B and C, on the other. However, it seems that this description of Jill’s options depends on Jill’s epistemic 
circumstances and is thus inconsistent with pure objectivism’s commitment to denying the normative 
relevance of epistemic circumstances. Moreover, since giving C is an action that Jill can intentionally 
perform under this description, it is difficult to see how one can reasonably deny that it is among Jill’s 
options. It is thus no surprise that pure objectivists in fact embrace the claim that Jill ought to give C; see 
e.g. Graham (2010, 97–98) and Bykvist (2011, 34–35). 
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these facts could provide reasons.29 Could the fact that C is the cure be outweighed by the 
fact that Jill does not know whether C is the cure?30 That also does not make sense. 
Perhaps the fact that Jill does not know whether C is the cure is a reason for her not to 
give C. But this could only be so if the fact that C is the cure is not at the same time a 
reason for her to give C. Again, there is no point of view from which both of these two 
facts can sensibly be weighed against each other. 
Hence, unless we accept an evidence constraint either for the existence of reasons 
or the relevance of reasons for deliberative conclusions, we are stuck with the conclusion 
that Jill ought to give C. This gives rise to a number of complaints against such a view. 
First of all, the conclusion is at least prima facie implausible. Second, it conflicts with 
intuitive connections between ought-judgments and legitimate criticism. In standard cases 
of ignorance, such as Day’s End, pure objectivists can reply that our intuitions are misled 
by the fact that the agent justifiably believes the relevant action to be permissible, 
although in fact it is not. But this kind of debunking explanation is not available in 
known ignorance cases. Jill knows that giving A is not permitted by the pure objectivist’s 
lights, and so the objectivist cannot explain the intuitions that Jill ought to give A and 
that she would not be cricisable for giving A by reference to the fact that Jill could 
justifiably, though falsely, believe that she ought to give A.  
A further argument is that pure objectivism cannot account for the eminently 
plausible assumption that risks and chances, understood in terms of evidential probability, 
provide reasons for action. For example, the fact that giving C involves a 50 per cent risk 
of killing clearly seems a good reason against doing it, but as we have already seen, one 
                                                   
29 The same point applies to the suggestion that Jill’s reason against giving C is that doing so is 
incompatible with maximizing expected value; accepting this fact as a reason also does not make sense if one 
also accepts the fact that C is the cure to be among Jill’s reason. For this reason, I think that Broome’s view 
(in 2013, Ch. 3) according to which we should maximize expected rather than objective value in situations 
where, as he puts it, “consequentialism […] applies” (2013, 36), is coherent only in combination with an 
evidence constraint. 
30 Dancy (2000, 56) makes a suggestion along these lines in response to an example of Prichard’s (1932, 
93). Dancy’s aim in this context is not to defend pure objectivism, but to show that one can make sense of 
Prichard’s point that ignorance is normatively significant while maintaining that reasons are facts, i.e. 
without following Prichard in becoming a subjectivist. His suggestion that facts about one’s ignorance can 
be reasons is compatible, and, I think, makes most sense in combination with the evidence-relative view 
defended here. Indeed, Dancy suggests himself that there is an “agent-relative epistemic filter” for facts to be 
reasons, and he provides independent support for this claim (2000, 56–59). 
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cannot plausibly maintain this claim if one rejects an evidence constraint. Finally, there is 
of course the point that pure objectivism fails to provide normative guidance in 
circumstances of uncertainty and that we should expect a theory about the ‘ought’ of 
deliberation to provide guidance in a case like Jill’s.31 
I believe that these are powerful arguments for accepting an evidence constraint 
on reasons, but in the remainder of this essay, I will suggest that things are even worse for 
the pure objectivist. I will argue that pure objectivism not only fails to account for 
normative guidance, it seriously misguides agents, forcing them, on pain of irrationality, to 
make extremely irresponsible decisions. 
 
The misguidance argument 
It is clearly a condition for an acceptable theory of reasons that it allows a person in Jill’s 
circumstances, who deliberates in accordance with that theory, to rationally make a 
responsible decision. This is the first premise of the argument: 
 
(1) It is rationally possible for a person in Jill’s circumstances to make a responsible 
decision while deliberating in accordance with the correct theory of reasons. 
 
What decision could Jill responsibly make? No doubt, it is irresponsible to impose a 50 
per cent risk of death on someone in order to gain a 50 per cent chance of curing a minor 
complaint, so Jill cannot responsibly give B or C. Let us assume that postponing the 
treatment would be likely to lead to a fatal deterioration of John’s disease. It is then 
inevitable to accept: 
 
(2) The only responsible decision to make for a person in Jill’s circumstances is to give 
drug A. 
 
                                                   
31 For a further, independent argument for perspectivism, see also Kiesewetter (forthcoming). 
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Pure objectivists and perspectivists agree on this premise; it cannot reasonably be denied 
that if Jill acts responsibly, she will give drug A.32 
Next, let us suppose that Jill deliberates in accordance with pure objectivism. Jill 
must then come to believe that she either ought to give B or ought to give C. Let us 
suppose that she can only give one drug (for example because the financial resources only 
suffice for one treatment). It follows that, in a reasonably broad sense of ‘means’ that 
includes not only actions but also omissions, not giving A is a necessary means to giving B 
as well as to giving C. If Jill knows this, she has to conclude that not giving A is a 
necessary means to doing what she ought to do. And so she has to conclude that she 
ought not to give A. This follows from the transmission principle, according to which we 
ought to take the necessary means to actions we ought to perform, which is a valid 
inference rule for the deliberative ‘ought’.33 Thus: 
 
(3) A person who deliberates in accordance with pure objectivism in Jill’s circumstances 
must believe that she ought not to give drug A. 
 
My final assumption concerns the connection between deliberative conclusions about 
what one ought to do and rational decision-making. Deliberation aims at forming 
intentions and beliefs in the light of reasons. The point of practical deliberation, in 
particular, is to come to a decision to act. There is thus an important connection between 
ought-judgments and intentions: roughly speaking, one cannot rationally refrain from 
intending an action that one believes one ought, in the deliberative sense, to perform. 
Following John Broome, we can call this the enkratic principle.34  
The enkratic principle is subject to qualifications. For example, if you rationally 
believe that you will φ no matter whether you intend to φ or not, then, plausibly, you may 
rationally refrain from intending to φ while believing that you ought to φ. How exactly to 
                                                   
32 See e.g. Graham (2010, 97). 
33 As I have argued in Kiesewetter (2015).  
34 See Broome (2013, 170–175). Note that by affirming the enkratic principle, I do not (like Broome) 
assume the existence of a structural requirement of rationality, but only a claim about sufficient conditions 
for having the property of irrationality. See Kiesewetter (2013, Ch. 1.4) for a discussion of this distinction. 
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spell out the qualifications of the enkratic principle is a matter of debate that I would like 
to bracket here.35 For the purposes of the discussion, I will therefore only assume a much 
weaker principle, according to which one cannot rationally make a positive decision for an 
action that one believes one ought not to perform. I can find no good reason to think that 
this weaker principle is subject to any qualifications: 
 
(4) Weak enkratic principle: It is not rationally possible to decide for an action while at the 
same time believing that one ought not to perform this action. 
 
Assumptions (1)-(4) entail that pure objectivism is false: 
 
(5) It is not rationally possible for a person in Jill’s circumstances to decide to give drug A 
while deliberating in accordance with pure objectivism (from 3 and 4). 
(6) It is not rationally possible for a person in Jill’s circumstances to make a responsible 
decision while deliberating in accordance with pure objectivism (from 2 and 5). 
(7) Therefore, pure objectivism is not the correct theory of reasons (from 1 and 6). 
 
I shall refer to this as the misguidance argument, because according to it, pure objectivism 
not only fails to account for positive guidance in circumstances of uncertainty, it seriously 
misguides agents into making irresponsible decisions. If Jill believes in pure objectivism, 
she cannot rationally make the only responsible decision; she must, on pain of 
irrationality, risk the death of her patient by either refraining from any intentional action 
or by giving B or C.  
Note that the argument also applies to views that accept a weaker constraint than 
the synchronic evidence constraint, including versions of the evidence-relative view that 
assume that for R to be a reason (or for R to be a contributing reason) for A, A need not 
believe or know R, she only needs to be in a position to know R.36 To see this, imagine an 
                                                   
35 See again Broome (2013, 170–175) for a discussion of these qualifications. 
36 By the same token, it also applies to the view defended by Raz, who accepts that reason-giving facts have 
to be in principle knowable by the agent, but denies that “temporary epistemic limitations affect the force of 
reasons” (2011, 126). 
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example in which Jill must order the treatments online, and she has exactly ten seconds 
left to send the order for A, B, or C (the order will not be mailed in time unless it is made 
before 6 P.M.). Suppose that she is in a position to know whether B or C is the cure, but 
it would take longer than ten seconds to do the thinking. Suppose that she knows all this; 
a reliable colleague has told her that she has all the information necessary to conclude 
which is the cure, but she has found it impossible to figure it out on the fly. If Jill believes 
in the envisaged version of the evidence-relative view, she has to conclude that she ought 
not to order A. But clearly this is the only responsible decision that she can make. And so 
the misguidance argument shows that synchronic reasons (or contributing synchronic 
reasons) must be immediately accessible; it is not enough that we are in a position to 
know them. 
 
The misguidance argument defended 
Let us reconsider the premises of the misguidance argument, in order to see where the 
opponent of the evidence constraint may try to resist it. Premise (1) seems beyond 
reasonable dispute. If it does not constitute a reductio of a view about reasons that 
deliberating in accordance with it forces Jill, on pain of irrationality, to risk John’s death, 
then I do not know what would. That the only responsible decision for Jill is to give drug 
A (2) cannot seriously be questioned. That deliberating in accordance with pure 
objectivism in Jill’s circumstances involves believing that one ought not give A (3) seems 
similarly uncontroversial: to my knowledge, it has not been denied and is often explicitly 
embraced by pure objectivists.37 Moreover, rejecting that assumption is, as we have seen, 
incompatible with the transmission principle, which is intuitively plausible and can be 
supported by independent arguments.38 It thus seems that the only way for objectivists to 
avoid the conclusion is to deny (4), the weak enkratic principle. 
It is just very difficult to see how one can deny this principle given that we are 
concerned with the ‘ought’ of what one has overall decisive reason to do, and not, at least 
                                                   
37 For example, both Bykvist (2011, 34–35) and Graham (2010, 97–98) assume that pure objectivism 
entails that Jill ought not to give A, and it is clear that if this is an implication, then it is one that Jill can, in 
her epistemic circumstances, come to believe by deliberation. 
38 See Kiesewetter (2015, §4). 
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not primarily, with the ‘ought’ of moral obligation.39 Note that everything I have claimed 
is consistent with denying the thesis of moral rationalism, according to which we always 
have overall decisive reason to do what we are morally obliged to do. If you deny this 
thesis, then you might also deny that it is not rationally possible to intend what you 
believe you ought not to do, where ‘ought’ refers to moral obligation. But the rejection of 
moral rationalism gives no cause for denying the weak enkratic principle, according to 
which it is not rationally possible to intend what you believe you ought not to do, where 
‘ought’ refers to overall decisive reason. 
The whole point of coming to a deliberative conclusion about what one ought to 
do is to guide decision-making in a rational way. How then can it be rational to maintain 
a deliberative conclusion to the effect that one ought, all things considered, not to per-
form an action and then decide to do it nonetheless? In abandoning the weak enkratic 
principle, the pure objectivist seems to concede that the ‘ought’ that he has in mind is 
not, after all, the ‘ought’ that we employ in deliberative conclusions. 
 At this point of the debate, pure objectivists will be inclined to propose a 
qualification of the weak enkratic principle, which allows them to say that we can guide 
our decisions by ought-judgments in usual cases, but not in known ignorance cases. For 
example, Krister Bykvist seems to suggest that the weak enkratic principle applies only in 
case the agent believes of a particular alternative option that it is permitted.40 If Jill believes in 
pure objectivism, then she does not believe of a particular option that this option is 
permitted. Hence, this qualification of the weak enkratic principle saves her from being 
irrational in deciding to give drug A. Similarly, Ralph Wedgwood claims that the weak 
enkratic principle applies only in case the option referred to in the ought-judgment is 
sufficiently specific, by which he means that the option is described as specific as “is 
rational for the agent to regard as potentially relevant to the decision in question”.41 Since 
not giving A is not an option that is, under this description, as specific as is rational to 
                                                   
39 I say “not primarily” because although I do not presuppose moral rationalism in this essay, I do believe it 
to be true, and on the assumption of moral rationalism, the misguidance argument goes through for moral 
obligation as well.   
40 Cf. Bykvist (2011, 39). 
41 Wedgwood (2013, 495). 
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regard as potentially relevant in Jill’s situation, the weak enkratic principle does not apply 
to Jill’s judgment that she ought not to give A. 
The first thing to note about these replies is that they seem ad hoc; they introduce 
a condition on an intuitively plausible claim in order to save a controversial theoretical 
assumption. Wedgwood, for example, argues for his qualification of the enkratic principle 
on the sole basis of pure objectivism’s verdict in known ignorance cases. This may be a 
legitimate move if this verdict were independently plausible. But as is generally agreed 
between both proponents and opponents of pure objectivism, it is at least prima facie 
plausible to assume that Jill ought to give A, or that Jill can correctly conclude in 
deliberation that she ought to give A.42 The relevant qualification of the weak enkratic 
principle therefore cannot be justified by plausibility assumptions about Jill’s case (or 
other known ignorance cases). It is not well motivated. 
Second, if pure objectivists make this manoeuvre, they still owe us an explanation 
of how Jill can rationally make the decision for A if she believes in the correct view about 
reasons. So far, Jill only believes that she ought not to give A, and does not believe of any 
other particular option that it is permitted – how is she going to decide, then? There must 
be some kind of judgment that licenses her to rationally decide in favour of A despite her 
judgment that she ought not to give A.43 The pure objectivist, in effect, has to say that even 
though Jill ought not to give A, she shmought to give A. And he will then have to agree 
that an agent cannot be rational if she decides in favour of an action that she believes she 
shmought not to do.  
For example, Krister Bykvist says that even though Jill ought not to give A, it is 
“sensible” for Jill to give A, it is “rational to prefer” giving A; and Jill “should be willing” 
to give A.44 Similarly, Peter Graham claims that even though Jill morally ought not to give 
A, Jill ought to give A in a “pragmatic” sense “associated with means and ends”.45 Joseph 
Raz suggests that even though Jill’s “best reason supports one of the other drugs”, Jill 
                                                   
42 For example, Bykvist explicitly says that giving A is “the intuitively right option” (2011, 34). 
43 Andric (2013) considers various options for what this judgment might be and convincingly refutes all of 
them. 
44 Bykvist (2011, 38–39). 
45 Graham (2010, 103). 
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could rationally decide for A on grounds of the judgment that doing so “is the best 
approximation to what she has best reason to do in the circumstances”.46 And Ralph 
Wedgwood proposes that Jill can rationally intend to give A because this intention 
“maximizes expected choiceworthiness”47, where by “choiceworthiness” he seems to mean 
the degree to which an option is favoured by reasons.48 
All of these suggestions may be understood as variants of the claim that the 
decision to give A can be licensed by a normative judgment other than an ought-
judgment, which, for convenience, I call a shmought-judgment. They all face the same 
dilemma. Either we have sufficient reason to do what we shmought to do or not. If we 
have sufficient reason to do what we shmought to do, then, since Jill shmought to give A, 
Jill has sufficient reason to give A. But then pure objectivism is false, for pure objectivism 
entails that Jill has decisive reason not to give A, and one cannot have sufficient reason for 
an action one has decisive reason not to perform. If, on the other hand, we do not have 
sufficient reason to do what we shmought to do, it is unclear how we could rationally 
make decisions on grounds of shmought-judgments. To say that we may not have 
sufficient reason to do what we shmought to do is to admit that the normative question 
“Why do what I shmought to do?” might not have an answer even though it can 
reasonably be asked. But if this is so, then it seems that we can rationally ignore what we 
shmought to do. The point is that what has normative authority for us are reasons; 
judgments about what is rational or sensible, even judgments about what is the best 
approximation to what one has reason to do, or what maximizes the expected degree of 
conformity with reasons, do not have normative force and thus cannot guide our 
decision-making unless we can assume that we have sufficient reason to follow them, which is 
exactly what the pure objectivist needs to deny. 
I conclude that the pure objectivist’s attack on the weak enkratic principle does 
not withstand scrutiny and the misguidance argument stands. 
 
                                                   
46 Raz (2011, 124). 
47 Wedgwood (2013, 496). 
48 Wedgwood (2013, 494). 
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4. CONCLUSION 
Let me briefly sum up the results of this paper. Perspectivists claim, while pure objectivists 
deny, that what an agent ought (or has overall decisive reason) to do can depend on this 
agent’s epistemic circumstances. I have first presented a version of perspectivism that 
holds on to the natural, objectivist ideas that what we ought to do depends on our 
reasons, and that our reasons are facts. According to this view, reasons are subject to an 
availability constraint, which can be spelled out in terms of an agent’s body of evidence. I 
have then put forward a particular account of this constraint, which draws on the 
distinction between synchronic and diachronic reason statements. According to this 
account, all reasons are subject to a counterfactual evidence constraint, which entails that 
synchronic but not diachronic reasons must be part of the agent’s present actual evidence. 
I have outlined (if only briefly) how this account can deal with phenomena in deliberation 
and advice, which suggests that reason statements can be geared to evidence that, is better 
than the agent’s present evidence and which therefore pose significant problems for 
standard versions of perspectivism. Moreover, I have argued that the counterfactual 
evidence constraint is independently motivated by considerations about the general 
relation between synchronic and diachronic reasons if one accepts the synchronic evidence 
constraint. Finally I have sketched a number of arguments for the synchronic evidence 
constraint and defended one of these arguments in detail. The argument purports to 
establish that a theory that denies this constraint misguides agents towards making 
irresponsible decisions on pain of irrationality and must therefore be false. I thus hope 
that this essay has contributed to a better understanding of how reasons are sensitive to 
available evidence – and why.49 
                                                   
49 Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at Humboldt University of Berlin, Lund University, 
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, and, first of all, at the conference “Normativity: Practical and 
Epistemic” at the University of Southampton in September 2015. I would like to thank the organisers of 
these events for giving me the opportunity to present my work and the participants for discussing it with 
me. I am especially grateful to Ben Bramble, Jan Gertken, David Hunter, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Toni 
Rønnow-Rasmussen, Thomas Schmidt, and the editors of this volume for written comments and/or 
extensive discussion of the material that entered into this essay. Parts of this paper draw on ideas of my 
article “‘Ought’ and the Perspective of the Agent” (Kiesewetter 2011) and Chapter 8 of my dissertation 
(Kiesewetter 2013). I owe thanks to everyone who contributed to these writings as well. Work on this paper 
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